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Abstract
This paper argues that in Euro-area economies, where the ECB cannot bail-out nancially distressed
governments, the scal multiplier is adversely a¤ected by the amount of public debt. A regression model
on a panel of 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011 shows that a 10 percentage point increase
in the debt-to-GDP ratio is connected to a slowdown in annual growth rates of 0.28 percentage point.
Furthermore, the e¤ectiveness of scal spending is adversely a¤ected by the amount of public debt; for a
debt-to-GDP ratio above 150% the impact on growth of the scal stimulus turns negative.
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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 Great Recession left behind a dramatic legacy: creeping growth and high long-
term unemployment rates, a devastated banking sector and huge public debts. Three years later,
Euro area countries are facing the worst di¢ culties. Financial instability and poor growth are now
compounding their e¤ects in the most disruptive way. With ECB target interest rate close to zero,
several economists echoed by many EU political leaders argue that only a massive scal stimulus
can revigorate the weakest economies. The basic rationale behind this view builds on traditional
Keynesian reasoning: low (short-term) interest rates combined with a depressed economy signal
an excess of savings over investment opportunities; in this context, a higher public spending and
the connected decit should not push up interest rates, but stimulate growth (Krugman, 2010).
The Keynesian policy framework was developed under the assumption that bonds and money
are perfect substitutes; in particular, bonds were seen as the risk-free asset. The contemporary
DSGE new Keynesian macroeconomics also builds on the assumption that the central bank can
maintain short and long-term interest rates on a pre-committed schedule (see Woodford, 2010).
Yet these days are gone. Public debt is no longer seen as the perfect hedge against nancial risks,
in particular in Euro area countries where the central bank cannot monetize public debt.1 If
the public debt is too high, small increases in this debt, triggered by scal stimulation of the
economy, might bring about large variations in risk-adjusted interest rates. The culprit is the
illiquidity risk: if investors lose condence in a government and refuse to hold its debt, the debt
service increases and pushes the debt on an unsustainable path.2 As an example, in 2011 and
2012, Italy, one of the four largest Euro area economies, has seen yields on 10-year Treasury bonds
crossing the 7% line for several times although it is running primary surpluses. Furthermore, in
"high-risk" countries, risk premia on public and corporate debt are highly correlated (IMF, 2012).
1 The no-bail out orthodoxy of the ECB was somehow relaxed in September 2012, with introduction of the
Outright Monetary Transactions programme. This new initiative allows the ECB to buy in the secondary market
3-year bonds issued by of distressed governments.
2 See Besancenot et al. (2004) for a dynamic model where a small and remote risk of unsustainability can trigger
imediate illiquidity default on public debt.
1
In turn, higher corporate interest rates would entail the crowding-out of private investment. If the
"nancial crowding-out" e¤ect takes over the direct public spending e¤ect, the spending multiplier
can be much smaller than one and even become negative.
In this paper, we aim to provide an analysis of the spending multiplier that takes into account
the nancial risk associated to large public debts. After introducing a spending multiplier that
incorporates an additional "nancial crowding-out" e¤ect, we study the relationship between pub-
lic spending, growth and public debt using a panel of 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011.
Both growth and the growth e¤ect of a scal stimulus appear to be weaker in high-debt countries.
Furthermore, the scal multiplier turns negative if the public debt raises above 150% of the GDP
(with a lower bound of 108% at the 95% condence level).
Recently several empirical papers have investigated the relationship between growth and debt
in the long run. For instance Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) analyze data on forty-four countries over
two hundred years. The show that the median growth rate is lower by one percentage point in
countries/periods where the debt-to-GDP is above 90% as compared to countries/periods where
the debt-to-GDP is below 90%. Kumar and Woo (2010) analyze a panel of advanced and emerging
economies over four years; they reveal a relationship between initial debt and growth: on average,
a 10 percentage point increase in initial debt-to GDP is associated to a slowdown in annual real
par capita GDP growth of 0.2 percentage point per year. Similar results were obtained for euro
area countries; Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) and Baum et al. (2012) show that a debt-
to-GDP ratio above 90-100% brings about a negative impact on growth rates. There is no explicit
model of for this negative relationship between growth and debt, but, as noticed by Cottarelli and
Jaramillo (2012, p.9), who reviewed this empirical literature, "high debt is expected to result in
lower growth because of crowding-out e¤ects on private investment".
The paper is organized as follows. We rstly introduce a simple analysis of the spending
multiplier that incorporates the nancial crowding out e¤ect. In the second part, we use data for
EU countries in the 1996-2011 period, to gauge the impact of debt on both growth rates and the
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e¤ectiveness of scal policy. The last section presents the conclusion.
2 Theory: the "augmented" spending multiplier
We start with the textbook IS condition:
Y = c[Y   T (Y )] + I(i) +G; (1)
where Y stands for the national income, c is the marginal propensity to consume (constant), with
c < 1, T are taxes as a function of income, with dT=dY = TY < 1; and G denotes public spending.
The public decit is DEF = G   T (Y ): Private investment I is is represented as a function of
i, the interest rate on corporate projects, with dI=di = Ii < 0. The price level is assumed to be
constant and ination expectations are zero.
Let us denote by  the (subjective) probability of default on the public debt and by  the
risk-free interest rate (constant). Without losing much explanatory power, we can assume that in
the event of default the debt residual value is zero (i.e., the haircut is 100%). With risk-neutral
investors, the no-trade o¤ condition implies a risk-adjusted interest rate on public debt r dened
by:
1 + r =
1 + 
1   : (2)
It turns out that the risk-adjusted interest rate on public debt is a convex, increasing function
in the subjective default probability ; r = r(): We admit that this probability is an increasing
function in the debt level D and the decit DEF ,  = F (D;DEF ); with @=@D = F1(; ) > 0; and
@=@DEF = F2(; ) > 0: We further assume that the cross derivative @2=@D@DEF = F12(; ) >
0 : this assumption is quite plausible: if the debt is high, chances that a higher decit pushes the
debt out of the sustainable path should increase, and vice-versa.
In Europe, many corporations depend on public orders, subsidies and state guarantees. Un-
der imperfect information, many investors use the country risk as a proxy for corporate risk, in
particular for small, non listed rms. Furthermore, the best risk rating of companies is in general
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capped by the country rating; when a rating agency downgrades a country, the average cost of
capital for corporations edges up (IMF 2012, p 39).3 Hence, we can assume that the interest
rate on corporate debt and interest rates on public debt are strongly correlated, more precisely,
we assume that risk-adjusted corporate interest rate can be represented as an increasing function
in r; denoted i = i(r).
Given this chain of e¤ects, we can write the corporate interest rate as an increasing function
in the public debt and the decit:
i = i(r(F (D;DEF ))) = '(D;DEF ) (3)
with '1 > 0; '2 > 0; '12 > 0; properties that result from properties of the F function.
A scal stimulus dG > 0 brings about an impact on decit, dDEF = (1   TY dYdG )dG > 0:
Since the variation in the debt is dD = DEF; a variation in decit has only a second order e¤ect
(positive) on the debt that we will neglect.
Then, by di¤erentiating the equilibrium condition (1):
dY = c (1  TY ) dY + Ii'2 (dG  TY dY ) + dG; (4)
we get the "augmented" public spending multiplier  as:
 =
dY
dG
=
1 + Ii'2
1  c (1  TY ) + TY Ii'2
: (5)
The properties of the multiplier are easy to study:
 If we compare  with the elementary multiplier m = [1  c (1  TY )] 1 ; it can be easily
checked that  < m: This is the direct consequence of the "nancial crowding-out e¤ect".
 Furthermore, if m is allays larger than one,  can be smaller than one (and even negative) if
the crowding out e¤ect is strong enough, which in turn depends on the response of investment
to i; and the response of corporate interest rate to public debt changes:  < 1, c < ( Ii'2):
3 For instance, the correlation between the daily CDS spreads on 10-year Treasury bonds and the ve biggest
industrial corporations in Spain (a "high-risk" country), in the 2010.07-2012.07 period is 0.80. If including the two
main banks, the correlation rises to 0.96.
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 Given the '12 > 0 assumption, we have d=dD < 0 : the larger the debt, the bigger the
impact of a scal stimulus on interest rate, and the more powerful is the crowding-out e¤ect.
The purpose of this elementary analysis was to emphasize the nancial crowding-out e¤ect that
can prevail when the debt-to-GDP ratio gets closer to the unsustainability limit, given investors
subjective assessment of the risk of default. The unsustainability limit has not been dened here,
but is probably much lower for countries where the central bank cannot bail out the government,
as compared to countries where the central bank can monetize public debt. A more powerful
analysis would include the LM relationship, and the external sector. In an open-economy context,
a higher nancial risk would contribute to depreciate the currency, and might entail a positive
e¤ect on net exports.
3 Empirical analysis
The European Union is made up of 27 countries in 2011. The EU-27 debt-to-GDP ratio increased
from 69.9% in 1996 to 82.5% in 2011, with a strong acceleration after 2007. Only six out of the
26 countries in our sample managed to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. The Appendix provides a
summary of the data. Besides the 11 founding members who created the Euro in 1999, six other
countries joined the club later on. In the light of our analysis, this is an important institutional
change insofar as at that moment they become more vulnerable to the illiquidity risk. In the
second semester of 2012 the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 90.0%, compared to 71.6% at the creation
of the European Monetary Union in 1999.
We estimate a growth equation, using panel on 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011; we
excluded Luxemburg given its special status and small population size.4 Data are provided by
the Eurostat online database.
Denoting by GROWTHit - the annual real growth rate of country i at time t; in percentage
points; DEFit - the public decit as a percentage of GDP of country i at time t; DEBTit - public
4 Including Luxemburg does not change the results.
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debt as a percentage of GDP of country i at time t; and DUMEMU - a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the country is member of the Euro area, the growth equation is:
GROWTHit = C+a0DEFit+a1DEBTit+a2 (DEBTit DEFit)+a3DUMEMUit+ui+it (6)
where ui is a country specic residual and it is the "usual" residual. The coe¢ cient a2 applies
to an interaction term between debt and decit.
We estimate equation (6) using both random and xed-e¤ect panel data estimators. The
panel is strongly balanced; there are 405 observations (4 observations are missing for Greece
(decit, 1996-2001), 4 observations for Malta (growth, 1996-2001) and one observation is missing
for Bulgaria in 1996). Table 1 presents the output of the estimation.
Coe¢ cients FE Coe¢ cients RE
C 6:640 5:991
DEF 0:959 0:684
DEBT  0:028  0:029
DEBT DEF  0:006  0:005
DUMEMU  2:103  1:522
u 1:66 0:51
 2:93 2:93
rho 0:24 0:03
R2 0:22 0:23
Table 1. Output Estimates of the Growth Equation
(*** = signicant at 1%; * = signicant at 10%)
A Hausman test suggests that we can rely on the xed-e¤ect model to properly represent
the country-level e¤ects; for the sake of comparison we also provide the output estimate of the
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random-e¤ect model.5
The regression model provides several interesting insights, in particular if we write the tted
growth equation (6) as:
GROWTHit = 6:64  0:028DEBTit + 0:006 (148 DEBTit)DEFit   2:103DUMEMUit (7)
 All things equal, a 10 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio would bring down
the growth rate by 0.28 percentage point on average, a gure in line with the ndings by
Kumar and Woo (2010).
 In line with textbook Keynesian wisdom, if the debt-to-GDP is relatively low here, below
148% (as calculated as the ratio of tted coe¢ cient a0=a2)  larger decits (and higher
spending) are associated to higher growth rates in the year when they occur. Hall (2009)
reviewed the empirical evidence for the US and concluded that, under normal circumstances,
GDP rises by roughly the amount of an increase in government purchases. According our
estimates, this would happen in the EU region only if the debt-to-GDP ratio would be close
to zero.
 Above the critical threshold of 148% debt-to-GDP, the impact of a positive decit on growth
rates turns negative. Notice that the 95% condence interval for this critical debt-to-GDP
is as large as [108; 201].6
 Notice also that the Euro area dummy seems to have a dramatic impact on growth. In other
words, EU countries outside the Euro-area tend to outperform Euro member countries.
Of course, all these estimates should be interpreted with caution since they build essentially
on linear relationships between the variables. The theoretical model has emphasized that the risk
5 The Breusch and Pagan LM test indicates that the RE e¤ect model is better than the pooled OLS estimator.
6 The condence interval of the ratio between the tted coe¢ cients is calculated with the Stata routine indicated
at www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2010-04/msg00429.html
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premium and the interest rate might edge up very strongly if investors believe that the debt gets
closer to the sustainablity threshold.
4 Conclusion
Whether scal stimulus can foster growth or not, it depends to a large extent on the response
of long-term interest rates and the strength of the crowding-out e¤ect on private investment.
In this paper, we argue that the interest rate response depends on investorsassessment of the
governments nancial stability. For very large public debts, a positive decit and additional debt
might entail a substantial rise in interest rates and a very powerful crowding-out e¤ect that can
o¤set the direct e¤ect of additional spending.
We back this rationale with empirical evidence on 26 European economies over the 1996-2011
period, which includes post-recession high-debt years. It turns out that a large public debt not
only has an adverse e¤ect on growth, but also reduces the positive e¤ect of a given scal stimulus.
More in detail, if the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a critical threshold with a central value of 148%,
the spending multiplier would become negative.
Policy implications are straightforward. For low public debt EU countries, scal policy can be
an interesting tool, to be used with cautiously. However, if high-debt European economies want
to stimulate growth, the most e¢ cient solutions lie on the structural reforms side.
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Appendix. Summary statistics for 26 EU member countries
Note: (a) - 1997; (b) - 2001-2011.
9
Country
Debt-to-GDP
1996
Debt-to-GDP
2011
Growth rate
Av.1996  2011
Decit-to-GDP
Av. 1996  2011
EMU
(year)
Austria 68.1 72.2 2.2 2.2 1999
Belgium 127.2 98.0 1.9 1.5 1999
Bulgaria 108.3(a) 16.3 2.6 0.1 
Cyprus 53.1 71.6 3.0 3.3 2008
Czech Rep. 11.9 41.2 2.8 3.9 
Denmark 69.4 46.5 1.3 1.0 
Estonia 7.6 6.0 5.0 0.2 2011
Finland 57 48.6 2.8 1.9 1999
France 58 85.8 1.7 3.5 1999
Germany 58.5 81.2 1.4 2.3 1999
Greece 99.4 165.3 1.9 7.7 2001
Hungary 72.4 80.6 2.3 5.3 
Ireland 71.7 108.2 4.7 3.0 1999
Italy 120.2 120.1 0.9 3.4 1999
Latvia 13.9 42.6 4.5 2.5 
Lithuania 13.8 38.5 5.2 3.7 
Malta 40.1 72.0 1.7(b) 5.5 2008
Netherlands 74.1 65.2 2.2 1.5 
Poland 43.4 56.3 4.4 4.7 1999
Portugal 58.2 107.8 1.6 4.8 1999
Romania 10.6 33.3 2.6 3.8 
Slovakia 31.1 43.3 4.3 5.7 2009
Slovenia 21.9 47.6 3.1 3.0 2007
Spain 67.4 68.5 2.7 2.7 1999
Sweden 73.3 38.4 2.7 0.7 
UK 51.3 85.7 2.3 3.4 
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